Brief Report: Schema consistent misinformation effects in eyewitnesses with autism spectrum disorder by Maras, Katie & Bowler, Dermot M
        
Citation for published version:
Maras, K & Bowler, DM 2011, 'Brief Report: Schema consistent misinformation effects in eyewitnesses with
autism spectrum disorder', Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, vol. 41, no. 6, pp. 815-820.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-010-1089-5
DOI:
10.1007/s10803-010-1089-5
Publication date:
2011
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication
The final publication is available at link.springer.com
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. May. 2019
Schema misinformation effects in ASD 
 
1 
1 
  
 
 
 
Brief Report: Schema consistent misinformation effects in eyewitnesses with 
autism spectrum disorder 
 
 
Katie Maras 
Dermot M Bowler 
 
Autism Research Group 
City University London 
 
 
Running Head: Schema misinformation effects in ASD 
 
 
Schema misinformation effects in ASD 
 
2 
2 
 
Abstract 
 
A number of studies have demonstrated schema-related misinformation effects in 
typical individuals, but no research to date has examined this with witnesses with 
autism spectrum disorder (ASD), despite their impaired ability to generate core 
elements that define everyday events. After witnessing slides depicting a bank 
robbery, 16 adults with ASD and 16 matched comparison individuals were exposed 
to post-event misinformation that was either schema typical or atypical. Consistent 
with previous work, the comparison group went on to report more schema typical 
misinformation than atypical misinformation. However so too did the ASD group, 
suggesting that individuals with ASD do have understanding of the causal links 
between events, persons and actions, an important finding from both theoretical and 
applied perspectives. 
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Event schemas are general event representations containing schematically 
organised knowledge and sequences of actions within particular spatial-temporal 
contexts; useful in organising information in memory and understanding different 
events (Schank & Abelson, 1977). However these schemas can have a negative 
effect such as when eyewitnesses spontaneously use them to aid their memory for a 
previously witnessed event of a particular type, and erroneously recall typical details 
even when the details were not actually seen (Holst & Pezdek, 1992). 
 
Schema-related misinformation (e.g. Hekkanen & McEvoy, 2005; Luna & Migueles, 
2008; Roediger, Meade & Bergman, 2001) and false memory effects (e.g. Garcia-
Bajos & Migueles, 2003; Holst & Pezdek, 1992; Tuckey & Brewer, 2003a, 2003b) 
have been demonstrated in eyewitness paradigms with typical individuals. However 
no research to date has examined this with witnesses with high-functioning autism, 
despite their well-documented difficulties in event memory and memory organisation. 
Individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) have reduced generalisation and 
global understanding of the meaning of an event; reduced influence of schematic 
expectations on spontaneous attention is evidenced by their slower response in 
detecting scene unrelated objects (Loth, Gomez & Happe, 2008). They also show 
reduced generalised event knowledge in narratives (Loveland & Tunali, 1993) and 
impaired ability to spontaneously generate core elements defining everyday events 
including going to a restaurant or the cinema (Volden & Johnson, 1999), however the 
ASD participants in that study were able to predict what would happen next in these 
events when given a number of choices.  
 
Schema misinformation effects in ASD 
 
4 
4 
The perceptual schema model (Biederman, 1981) and the priming model (Friedman, 
1979) both explain the facilitating effect of context in typical individuals by the 
priming of the presentation of contextual scenes with stored representations of 
schema-consistent information. Previous research using the cognitive interview 
(Fisher & Geiselman 1992; Geiselman 1984), which involves the reinstatement of 
contextual details experienced at the time of encoding, found that this technique not 
only failed to increase the number of correct details reported by individuals with ASD, 
but also significantly reduced their accuracy (Maras & Bowler, in press). It is possible 
that individuals with ASD qualitatively differ from typical individuals in how they store 
representations of an event, which would go some way to explaining the damaging 
effect of this interviewing technique on recall accuracy. However, if indiviuals with 
ASD rely less on typical schemas to organise event details in memory, they may be 
less susceptible to schema-related post-event misinformation than are typical 
individuals. We aimed to examine this possibility by introducing schema typical and 
atypical post-event misinformation for a previously witnessed bank robbery, an event 
for which most individuals are likely to have well-established schemas, before 
examining how witnesses with ASD compare to a typical matched comparison group 
in subsequently reporting this misinformation erroneously. We predicted that the 
ASD group would be less susceptible to accepting typical post event misinformation 
than the comparison group, and that whilst the comparison group would make 
significantly more schema-typical than atypical intrusions, there would be no such 
difference in the number of typical versus atypical intrusions made by the ASD 
group. We also examined participants’ free recall for details from the event, and in 
line with previous research (e.g. Bowler, Gardiner, Grice & Saavalainen, 2000) 
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predicted that the ASD group would recall significantly fewer correct details than the 
comparison group. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Sixteen individuals with ASD (14 male, 2 female) and 16 typical individuals (12 
males, 4 females) took part in this study. Comparison participants were individually 
matched to the ASD participants within 7 points of Verbal IQ as measured by the 
WAIS-R or WAIS-III UK (Wechsler, 1997), and groups did not differ on Performance 
IQ, Full Scale IQ, or age. One-way ANOVAs (Group x Interview) for chronological 
age, verbal IQ, performance IQ, and full-scale IQ found no significant main effects or 
interactions. Table 1 summarises these data.  
 
Individuals with ASD were diagnosed by clinicians using a range of approaches, and 
a review of records and/or assessment with the Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Schedule (Lord, Rutter, DiLavore & Risi, 1999) confirmed that all met DSM-IV criteria 
for ASD excluding the requirement for absence of clinically significant delay or 
abnormality of language development. Clinical diagnoses were checked against the 
DSM-IV criteria, and diagnoses were accepted only if explicit information on the 
criteria were present in the letter of diagnosis. ASD participants were recruited from 
autism support groups and societies, and from word of mouth in the Greater London 
and South East of England area. The comparison group was recruited from an 
existing database via local newspaper advertisements and none had a history of 
neurological or psychiatric illness. All participants were British-born. Participants 
were paid standard university fees for their participation.  
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INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
  
Materials  
The witnessed event comprised a slide sequence of stills taken from a video of a 
staged bank robbery previously used by Tuckey and Brewer (2003b). A total of 27 
slides were presented on a 17” monitor at a rate of 4 seconds per slide. They 
depicted two robbers wearing balaclavas approaching and entering a bank. One of 
the robbers approached the counter and demanded money from a female member of 
staff. The robber took the money and approached the door of the bank to leave, and 
as it opened looked up at the camera. Both robbers exited the bank and were seen 
running away. Misinformation was presented in the form of a mock newspaper 
extract (available from the first author on request). The extract contained an account 
of the bank robbery together with some related but irrelevant information (the rise in 
robberies over the past year in the UK and abroad). The extract also reported ten 
incorrect details that were not seen in the slides, five of which were schema typical 
(the robbers stuffed the money into a bag; one was carrying a gun; the customer was 
forced to the floor; the cashier was forced to put her hands up; one of the robbers 
kept watch), the other five were schema atypical (they removed their balaclavas; 
they held the door open for a customer before entering the bank; one the robbers 
had a can of cola in his hand; the cashier initially laughed at the robbers; one of the 
robbers poked his tongue out at the CCTV camera). To disguise this misinformation 
manipulation, we also included details that were correctly reported as having been 
seen in the slides. Typicality of items was determined by previous normative work 
(Garcia-Bajos, Migueles & Anderson 2009; Tuckey & Brewer, 2003a; 2003b), and 
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from a small pilot study by the present authors. Items were then rated by a second 
independent rater who was blind to the first rater’s coding. The second rater scored 
each detail in the final transcription according to whether they were schema typical, 
atypical, or schema irrelevant. An inter-rater reliability analysis using the Kappa 
statistic was performed to determine consistency among raters. The inter-rater 
reliability for the raters was found to be Kappa = 0.74 (p < 0.0001), 95% CI (0.60, 
0.87). 
 
Filler tasks comprised of two questionnaires (‘attitudes to crime and punishment’). 
The recall questionnaire contained 19 questions, ten of which pertained to the 
misinformation details. The other nine questions were filler questions and were used 
to again disguise the critical questions. Filler questions only referred to information 
seen in the slide sequence (e.g. “what was the name of the bank?”), whereas the 
critical misinformation questions referred to details that were only read in the extract 
(e.g. “what did the robbers do with the money?” referred to the misinformation 
“stuffed the money into a bag”). 
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually and informed that they would view a series of 
still slides taken from a video of a bank robbery before answering some questions 
relating to their attitudes toward crime and punishment (to maintain the cover story 
for the experiment and persuade participants that we really were interested in their 
attitudes to crime and punishment). Following presentation of the slides participants 
completed one of the filler tasks lasting around 20 minutes. 
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They were then exposed to misinformation and told they were to read an extract 
from a newspaper clipping about the bank robbery they had previously viewed slides 
of. Participants were allowed to read through the narrative at their own pace. 
Following completion of this and the other filler task (again lasting approx. 20 
minutes) participants were given the surprise memory test and asked to write down 
in as much detail as they could recall everything they remember from the slides. 
Participants were explicitly warned at this point to only report what they had seen in 
the slides. Following free-recall participants were presented with the recall questions 
and again warned to only answer with information they actually saw in the slides. 
After each question participants were asked to indicate how confident they were that 
their answer was correct on a 7-point Likert-scale (1 not at all; 7 very confident). 
 
Free recall coding. 
Each detail provided by participants in their free recall was coded against the original 
transcript for the slides as being correct or incorrect, and whether it was schema 
typical, atypical, or irrelevant. Subjective statements of opinion (e.g. “he looked a bit 
shifty”) were ignored, and details were only scored the first time that they were 
reported. Accuracy scores were also calculated by dividing the number of correct 
details reported by the total number of details reported (i.e. correct + incorrect). 
Misinformation questions coding. 
Answers to each of the five typical and five atypical misinformation-related questions 
were scored as intrusions if the critical item of misinformation was incorporated. 
 
Statistical analyses 
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Initially, we examined the data for distribution of normality and outliers. Three ASD 
participants were identified as outliers due to a high rate of correct details, high rate 
of incorrect details, and low accuracy respectively. Analyses were carried out with 
and without these participants and findings changed only marginally. For this reason, 
in line with the diversity inherent in ASD, they were included in the analyses. 
Analyses examined free-recall in relation to correct and incorrect details, and 
accuracy scores overall, before examining proportions of the incorrect details given 
in terms of whether they were previously read in the extract or new errors, and 
whether they were schema typical or atypical. Analyses then examined whether 
participants erroneously reported details that were only read in the extract (and not 
seen in the slides) in response to specific questions, and whether these differed 
depending on whether they were schema typical or atypical. Estimates of effect size, 
Cohen’s d, are reported. 
 
Results 
Free recall 
Accuracy of free recall. 
Mean numbers of correct and incorrect details recalled by the two groups and their 
accuracy scores are set out in Table 2. Inspection of the means shows that the ASD 
group recalled fewer correct details but more incorrect details than the comparison 
group, and also had a lower overall accuracy rate. This impression was confirmed by 
a one-way ANOVA, which showed that the ASD group were significantly less 
accurate than the comparison group, F (1, 30) = 7.91, p < 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.99, 
and that this was indeed reflected by the ASD group reporting significantly fewer 
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correct details, F (1, 30) = 8.02, p < 0.05, Cohen’s d = 1.00, and marginally 
significantly more incorrect details, F (1, 30) = 4.02, p = 0.054, Cohen’s d = 0.70 than 
the comparison group. Thus, the ASD group were significantly worse in terms of both 
quantity and quality of recall. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Source of errors 
Read vs. New errors. 
In order to examine whether, compared to the comparison group, the ASD group 
were reporting a higher proportion of inaccurate details that they had read in the 
extract, or whether they were erroneously reporting more new errors not previously 
read, we conducted a one-way ANOVA with proportions of errors that were for 
details previously presented in the extract, and proportions of errors for details that 
were new. These proportions were calculated by dividing by the total number of 
errors each participant had made. Inspection of the means in Table 3 and 
subsequent ANOVA confirmed that the ASD and comparison group did not differ in 
the proportion of errors they made for details that they had previously read in the 
extract. Nor did they differ for the proportion of their errors that were new details that 
were neither seen in the slides nor presented in the extract, all F’s < 1.00, ns. 
 
Typical vs. Atypical correct and incorrect details. 
We also examined typicality of correct and incorrect details. As can be seen by 
inspection of the means in Table 3, and confirmed by a one-way ANOVA, there was 
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no difference between groups for the proportion of correct details that were typical, F 
(1, 30) = 1.08, p = 0.31, Cohen’s d = 0.37, or atypical, F (1, 30) = 0.02, p = 0.90, 
Cohen’s d = 0.04. There was also no difference between groups for the proportion of 
errors that were typical, F (1, 20) = 0.31, p = 0.59, Cohen’s d = 0.23, or atypical, F (1, 
20) = 0.60, p = 0.45, Cohen’s d = 0.28. A 2 (group: ASD vs. control) x 2 (schema: 
typical vs. atypical) mixed ANOVA did however reveal a main effect of schema 
typicality, F (1, 20) = 8.87, p < 0.01, Cohen’s d = 0.94. A significantly higher 
proportion of errors were for details that were schema typical (Mean = 0.37, SD = 
0.43) than details that were atypical (Mean = 0.07, SD = 0.14). There was no group x 
typicality interaction, F (1, 20) = 0.08, p = 0.78, indicating that both groups similarly 
made more schema typical than atypical errors (due to floor effects, we were unable 
to analyse within read only and new errors for typical and atypical details). 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Specific questions  
Mean numbers of typical and atypical intrusions made in response to the questions 
by the two groups are set out in Table 4. Inspection of the table shows that the ASD 
and comparison groups both made more typical than atypical intrusions, but the 
groups did not appear to differ from one another on the number of intrusions they 
made for each type. This impression was confirmed by a 2 (group: ASD vs. 
comparison) x 2 (schema: typical vs. atypical) mixed ANOVA, which revealed a 
significant main effect of type of intrusions, F (1, 30) = 22.43, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 
1.27; participants made more typical intrusions (Mean = 1.53, SD = 1.24) than 
atypical ones (Mean = 0.28, SD = 0.63). However there was not a significant 
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interaction between typicality of intrusions and group, F (1, 30) = 0.51, p = 0.48; the 
groups were similar in that they made more schema-typical intrusions than they did 
atypical ones. Next we examined whether confidence differed for typical vs. atypical 
intrusions, and whether both groups reported these intrusions with similar rates of 
confidence in the accuracy of their answers. There was no main effect of confidence 
between typical and atypical intrusions, F (1, 4) = 2.37, p = 0.20, Cohen’s d = 0.45, 
nor was there a significant group x typicality interaction for confidence, F (1, 4) = 
1.40, p = 0.30; both groups reported typical and atypical intrusions with similar rates 
of confidence (see Table 4). 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
 
 
Discussion 
Our study examined free-recall and schema-related misinformation effects in 
witnesses with ASD. In line with some previous research (e.g., Bennetto, Pennington 
& Rogers, 1996; Bowler et al., 2000), but inconsistent with others (e.g. Maras & 
Bowler, in press; Renner, Kilner & Klinger, 2000) we found that the ASD group 
recalled fewer correct details and were less accurate than their matched comparison 
group in their free recall for a previously witnessed event. Coupled with previous 
research showing that individuals with ASD can recall as much and as accurately as 
typical individuals when support is provided at test (Bowler, Gardiner & Berthollier, 
2004), this finding highlights the need for future work to assess effective retrieval 
strategies for use in investigative eyewitness contexts to increase both the quantity 
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and quality of details that they recall. That the ASD group did not differ from the 
comparison group in the types of errors that they made ( typical, atypical, read, or 
new) suggests that individuals with ASD equally erroneously report schema typical 
details, and are as susceptible to confuse source from a post-event extract as are 
typical individuals. Both groups made more schema typical than atypical errors, 
suggesting that individuals with ASD do use existing schemas to aid their memory 
leading them to erroneously report schema-consistent but inaccurate details. 
 
We also found that both ASD and typical individuals were more likely to go on to 
report previously presented misinformation that was schema typical than information 
that was atypical, and that both groups did so with similar rates of confidence. This is 
at odds with some previous research (e.g. Loveland & Tunali, 1993; Volden & 
Johnson, 1999), however other work suggests that higher functioning ASD 
individuals do use event schemas and that this is related to factors such as theory of 
mind (Loth, Gomez & Happe, 2008). This suggests that individuals with ASD do 
have some understanding of the causal relationship between events, persons and 
actions, and previous findings of an impairment for these types of details when 
interviewed with a cognitive interview (Maras & Bowler, in press) highlights the 
necessity for further examination as to why this is. 
 
Our finding of no difference between groups for schema-related intrusions appears 
to pose problems for the weak central coherence account (WCC, Frith, 1989) in that 
a local processing style might not necessarily mean global processing impairments 
and reduced susceptibility to schema-related misinformation effects. However the 
latest version of the WCC account (Happe & Frith, 2006) argues that individuals with 
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ASD have a detail-focussed cognitive style which does not necessarily lead to a 
difficulty in ‘seeing the bigger picture’. The present study did not specifically assess 
local versus global processing of details per se, and we acknowledge that some of 
the details may have reflected more global elements central to the event schema 
(e.g. robbers carrying a gun in a bank robbery), whilst others may have reflected 
more local elements not central to the story (e.g. the cashier being forced to stick her 
hands up) however a full examination of this was beyond the scope of this paper. We 
do however acknowledge the limitations of the present study, including the modest 
sample size, the fact that the sample was restricted to high-functioning individuals 
with ASD, and the close to ceiling effect for accuracy score for the typical group. 
Nevertheless the present study is the first of its kind to examine schema-related 
misinformation effects in witnesses with ASD. That they are just as susceptible to 
these misinformation effects as are typical witnesses is important from both 
theoretical, in terms of WCC, and applied perspectives. Findings indicate that 
practitioners should be aware that witnesses with ASD are as susceptible to 
schema-related misinformation effects as typical witnesses are.  
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Table 1  
Age and IQ scores for the ASD and comparison groups (standard deviations in 
parentheses)  
 
 ASD  
(N = 16) 
Comparison  
(N= 16) 
Age (years) 37.25 (12.59) 45.00 (10.67) 
VIQª 110.06 (13.00) 111.38 (15.43) 
PIQb 108.31 (13.64) 106.75 (15.43) 
FIQc 110.06 (13.65) 110.00 (16.36) 
 
a Verbal IQ; b Performance IQ; c Full-scale IQ (WAIS-R UK or WAIS-III UK) 
 
Schema misinformation effects in ASD 
 
20 
20 
Table 2.  
Mean number of correct and incorrect details, and accuracy scores for free recall by 
ASD and comparison groups (standard deviations are in parentheses)  
 
 Correcta  Incorrectb Accuracya 
ASD 19.00 
(10.37) 
2.56 (2.94) 0.90 (0.10) 
Comparison 27.50 
(6.04) 
1.00 (1.03) 0.97 (0.03) 
 
a significant between group difference p < 0.005;  
b p = 0.054 
 
 
Schema misinformation effects in ASD 
 
21 
21 
 
Table 3.  
 
Mean proportion of errors made in free recall for details that had been previously 
read in the extract, details that were neither seen in the slides nor read, details that 
were typical, and details that were atypical for ASD and comparison groups 
(standard deviations are in parentheses)  
 
Source of errors 
 Read New Schema 
Typical 
Schema 
Atypical 
ASD 0.32 (0.41) 0.68 (0.41) 0.42 (0.42) 0.09 (0.13) 
Comparison 0.32 (0.46) 0.68 (0.46) 0.32 (0.46) 0.05 (0.15) 
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Table 4.  
Mean numbers of intrusions made by ASD and comparison groups and mean 
confidence with which they were made (standard deviations are in parentheses) 
 Schema Typical Intrusions Schema Atypical Intrusions 
Mean intrusions  Mean 
confidence 
Mean intrusions  Mean 
confidence 
ASD 1.75 (1.34) 4.87 (1.47) 0.31 (0.79) 3.11 (2.83) 
Compa
rison 
1.31 (1.14) 5.05 (1.54) 0.25 (0.45) 4.75 (2.22) 
 
 
